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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
V. 
NIKOLAOS ANTONIO, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. 20151070-CA 
Appellant is not incarcerated. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Mr. Antonio was convicted of three counts of violation of a protective order, class 
A misdemeanors in violation of Utah Code§ 76-5-108. The Sentence, Judgment, 
Commitment is attached as Addendum A. Utah Code§ 78A-4-103 (2)(e) provides 
jurisdiction. 
ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
Issue: Whether the court erred by denying Mr. Antonio's renewed motion for a 
directed verdict where the State' s evidence failed to show that he intentionally or 
knowingly violated the protective order. 
Standard of Review: This Comi reviews a challenge to the trial court's ruling on a 
motion for a directed verdict "for correctness, giving no paiiicular deference to the trial 
court's legal conclusions." State v. Hirschi, 2007 UT App 255, il15, 167 P.3d 503 
(alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). It will "uphold the trial court's 
decision if, upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn 
from it, [it] conclude[s] that some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could 
find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
Preservation: This issue was preserved. R.318-21 (Mr. Antonio's motion for a 
directed verdict and trial court's ruling); 369-70 (Mr. Antonio's renewed motion for a 
directed verdict and trial court's ruling). 
STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes are relevant to the issue on appeal: Utah Code§ 76-5-108. 
Its text is provided in Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 16, 2014, the State filed an Information charging Mr. Antonio with 
one count of violation of a protective order, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code§ 76-5-108. R.1-3. The Information was subsequently amended to include two 
additional counts of violation of a protective order, class A misdemeanors. R.44-45, 53-
54. Mr. Antonio was bound over on all counts. R.44-45. 
A one-day jury trial was held on August 26, 2015. R.158. At the close of the 
State ' s case, Mr. Antonio made a motion for a directed verdict on all three counts. R.160, 
318-1 9. The court denied that motion. R. 160, 320-21. Before the case was submitted to 
the jury, Antonio renewed his motion for a directed verdict, which was also denied. 
R.160-61, 369-70. He was found guilty on all three counts. R.133, 404. 
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Mr. Antonio was sentenced to 365 days injail on Counts 1, 2, and 3. R.181 -82. 
For Count 1, the court suspended his jail term by 305 days, and for Counts 2 and 3, it 
suspended bothjail terms by 365 days. R.181-82. Mr. Antonio timely appealed. R.189-
90. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State's Allegations. 
Nikolaos Antonio and Leslie Kerbs shared a four-year relationship and had a child 
together. R.287-88. After their relationship ended, Ms. Kerbs received a temporary 
protective order against Mr. Antonio, which was granted on May 21, 2014. R.288-89. A 
pe1manent protective order was subsequently entered on June 18, 2015 and served on Mr. 
Antonio on June 19, 2014. R.289-90, 309-10; State's Ex. 1. The protective order 
prohibited Mr. Antonio from contacting Ms. Kerbs and ordered that supervised visits 
with the child be arranged through Kerbs's mother or father. R.290-92; State's Ex. 1. 
Ms. Kerbs alleged that Mr. Antonio called her three times on July 8, 2014. R.297-
303, 305. Ms. Kerbs recorded the first call, which is provided as follows: 
Ms. Kerbs: Hello. 
Mr. Antonio: Who's this? 
Ms. Kerbs: This is Leslie .. .. ·who's this? 
Mr. Antonio: Oh, hi. 
Ms. Kerbs: Who's this? 
Mr. Antonio: Sorry. 
Ms. Kerbs: For what? 
Mr. Antonio: I didn't mean to call you I guess. 
Ms. Kerbs: What do you mean, you guess? 
Mr. Antonio: I didn't mean to call you ... . When can I see [our 
daughter]? 
3 
Ms. Kerbs: You know you have to talk to my 1110111 about that. You're not 
supposed to be calling me. 
Mr. Antonio: [inaudible] one of the days I can go to her house. 
Ms. Kerbs: You have to call my 1110111 for that, okay? 
Mr. Antonio: Are you really doing all this, Leslie? 
Ms. Kerbs: Do not call me again. 
R.295, 297, 305-06; State's Ex. 2. 
Ms. Kerbs testified that Mr. Antonio called from an unknown telephone number 
ending in 1330 ("the ' 1330' number") rather than Antonio's personal number that was 
stored in her cell phone and associated with Antonio's first name, "Nik" ("the 'Nik' 
number"). R.297-302, 366-68; State' s Exs. 3-4. However, she previously told the police 
that Mr. Antonio called from the "Nik" number, not the "1330" number. R.314. 
After the call ended, Ms. Kerbs called police dispatch because she was concerned 
Mr. Antonio was violating the protective order. R.300, 303. She testified that while she 
was on the phone with the police, Mr. Antonio called a second time, but she did not 
answer the call. R.300. Kerbs claimed that she took a screenshot of the call log on her 
cellphone, which showed a missed call from the "Nik" number. R.300; State's Ex. 3. 
According to Ms. Kerbs, Mr. Antonio called a third time from the "1330" number 
he first called from. R.301-03, 367-68; State's Ex. 4. She testified that Mr. Antonio "just 
said 'hey' multiple times trying to get [her] attention," and then she hung up the phone. 
R.303. Ms. Kerbs said she took another screenshot of this call. R.302. She gave the 
recorded conversation and both screenshots to the police. R.295-302. 
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Officer ·watson, who spoke with Ms. Kerbs about Mr. Antonio's alleged 
protective order violation, also had a conversation with Mr. Antonio that day. R.312-13. 
Officer Watson testified that Mr. Antonio denied calling or making any contact with Ms. 
Kerbs. R.313. According to Watson, Mr. Antonio indicated he was aware that a 
protective order was in place and understood that he was prohibited from contacting Ms. 
Kerbs. R.313. The conversation between Officer Watson and Mr. Antonio was not 
recorded. R.314-15. 
After the State rested, Mr. Antonio moved for a directed verdict on all three 
counts. R.318-19. Specifically, Mr. Antonio argued that the State failed to present 
sufficient evidence with regard to the "intent element" of violation of a protective order 
counts. R.318-19. The court denied Mr. Antonio's directed verdict motion, reasoning 
"that a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty on all three counts." R.320-21. 
Mr. Antonio did not Believe that an Active Protective Order was in Place. 
Mr. Antonio presented evidence showing that he did not knowingly or 
intentionally violate the protective order; rather, he believed that the protective order was, 
in effect, stayed by a motion to set aside judgment he filed on the same day the protective 
order was entered. 
After a protective order hearing on June 18, 2014, a permanent protective ordered 
was entered in favor of Ms. Kerbs. Mr. Antonio-a pro se litigant-was at the courthouse 
that day, but did not attend the protective order hearing due to some confusion. R.332-34, 
347. Shortly after the hearing concluded, Mr. Anontio spoke to the judge's clerk, who 
advised him to fill out a motion to set aside default judgment with regards to the 
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protective order. R.335. Mr. Antonio then went to the self-help center at the comthouse 
and completed and filed a motion to set aside judgment. R.336-339; Def. Ex. 4. 
Based on conversations with comt personnel, Mr. Antonio believed that his 
motion to set aside judgement operated to "strike the protective order" and set aside the 
judgment until he had a new hearing. He testified that he left the courthouse thinking 
there was no active protective order in place at that time. R.337-38, 340. 
Mr. Antonio explained that when he called Ms. Kerbs on July 8, 2014, he did not 
initially know that he was calling her. R.341-42. According to Mr. Antonio, he returned a 
missed call from a number in his phone, however, he did not realize it was Kerbs's 
number because he had previously deleted Kerbs's contact information. R.342. Mr. 
Antonio explained that he did not initially call Kerbs on purpose, but also did not believe 
that bis conversation with her amounted to a protective order violation because he was 
under the impression that the protective order "was not active until [they] had a hearing." 
R.342-43 . Mr. Antonio testified to only one telephone call to Kerbs on July 8, 2014. See 
R.332-64 
After speaking with Ms. Kerbs, Mr. Antonio called Officer Watson regarding an 
unrelated matter. R.344-45. Mr. Antonio then called the court to verify the status of the 
protective order and motion to set aside judgment. R345-46; Def. Ex. 3. He explained 
that prior to his conversation with Officer Watson, he was under the impression that there 
was no protective order in effect. R.346. 
Before the case was submitted to the jury, Mr. Antonio renewed his motion for a 
directed verdict. He argued that the evidence was not sufficient to show that he 
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"knowingly and intentionally violated the protective order on any of the three occasions." 
R.369-70. The court denied this motion. R.370. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Mr. Antonio argues that the trial comi e1Ted when it denied his directed verdict 
motions because the State's evidence was insufficient to satisfy the elements of violation 
of a protective order. Specifically, he contends that the State did not produce sufficient 
evidence to show that he knowingly or intentionally violated the protective order. 
Therefore, Mr. Antonio requests that this Comi reverse his convictions on all counts. 
ARGUMENT 
I. TIDS COURT SHOULD REVERSE ON ALL COUNTS BECAUSE THE 
STATE DID NOT PRODUCE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SATISFY THE 
ELEMENTS OF VIOLATION OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER. 
Mr. Antonio contends that the trial court eITed when it denied his renewed motion 
for a directed verdict because the State failed to introduce evidence sufficient to support 
the charged crimes. Accordingly, he asks this Court to reverse his convictions for 
violation of a protective order on all counts. 
This Court will "'reverse the jury's verdict in a criminal case when"' it concludes 
'" as a matter of law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant conviction."' State v. 
Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, ifl 0, 2 P.3d 954. It will '"view the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the jury verdict,"' and reverse '" if the evidence is so "inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime.""' Id.; Hirschi, 2007 UT App 255, ifl 5 n.7 
(when "determin[ing] whether some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could 
7 
find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, [the] 
court necessarily needs to determine if the evidence [presented] is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). 
Although the burden of establishing insufficiency of the evidence "is high, it is not 
impossible." Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, i)l 0. This Corni "'will not make speculative 
leaps across gaps in the evidence."' Id. '" Every element of the crime charged must be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt."' Id. And even though "the court must ordinarily 
accept the jury's determination of witness credibility, when the witness's testimony is 
inherently improbable, the court may choose to disregard it." State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 
23, i)16, 210 P.3d 288. In fact, "[i]n a criminal case ... the trial court may afford less 
deference to inherently improbable, inconsistent, uncorroborated witness testimony." Id. 
Indeed, " [a] conviction not based on substantial reliable evidence cannot stand." Id. i)14 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
Mr. Antonio contends that the State's evidence was so inconclusive that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that he committed violation 
of a protective order on all three counts. To sustain a conviction for violation of a 
protective order, the State must provide evidentiary proof that "(1) the defendant was 
subject to a protective order; (2) the defendant was properly served with the protective 
order; and (3) the defendant intentionally or knowingly violated the order." State v. 
Peterson, 2008 UT App 137, at *1 (emphasis added) (alterations and quotation marks 
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omitted); Utah Code § 76-5-108 (providing that a person is guilty of violation of a 
protective order if the defendant is "subject to a protective order" and "intentionally or 
knowingly violates that order after having been properly served"). 1 
In this case, Mr. Antonio maintains that the marshaled evidence is insufficient to 
show that he committed violation of a protective order. See infra Part I.A. Specifically, he 
argues that the State's evidence was insufficient to show that he knowingly or 
intentionally violated the protective order. See infra Part LB. 
A. The Marshalled Evidence is Insufficient. 
When raising an insufficient evidence claim, the defendant '"must marshal the 
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict."' State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, 
il14, 989 P.2d 1065. The marshaling requirement is "a natural extension of an appellant's 
burden of persuasion," not a ground for procedural default. State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, 
il41, 326 P.3d 645. 
The State provided the following evidence to suppo1i its claim that Mr. Antonio 
committed three counts of violation of a protective order: 
1. Ms. Kerbs received a temporary protective order against Mr. Antonio, which was 
granted on May 21 , 2014 and extended to June 18, 2014. R.288-89, 348-50. Mr. 
1 Under Utah law, a person acts "intentionally" "when it is his conscious objective 
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result." Utah Code§ 76-2-103. A person 
acts "knowingly" "with respect to his conduct or to circumstances smrounding his 
conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances." Id. 
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Antonio had notice of the temporary protective order. R.348-50; see also State's 
Exs. 5-6. 
2. A pennanent protective order was entered on June 18, 2015.R.289-90; State's Ex. 
1. The protective order prohibited Mr. Antonio from contacting Ms. Kerbs. R.290-
92; State's Ex. 1. The protective order also stated as follows: "This is a court 
order. No one except the court can change it. If you do not obey this order, you 
can be arrested, fined, and face other charges. This order is valid in all U.S. states 
and teITitories." R.352-53; State's Ex. 1. 
3. Mr. Antonio did not attend the permanent protective order hearing held on June 
18, 2015. R.332-34, 352. After the hearing that day, he filed a motion to set aside 
judgment. R.336-339; Def. Ex. 4. Based on conversations with comi personnel, 
Mr. Antonio believed that his motion to set aside judgement operated to "strike the 
protective order" and set aside the judgment until he had a new hearing. R.33 7-38. 
Antonio never talked to the judge about his motion to set aside judgement. R.355, 
358. 
4. Mr. Antonio was served with the protective order on June 19, 2014. R.289-90, 
309-10; State's Ex. 1. On June 24, 2014, Mr. Antonio called the court to inquire 
about a matter related to service of his motion to set aside judgement. R.362; Def. 
Ex. 3. 
5. On July 8, 2014, Ms. Kerbs alleged that Mr. Antonio called her three times. 
R.297-303, 305. She claimed that she never called or texted Mr. Antonio since the 
protective order was entered. R.365. Ms. Kerbs testified that the first call came 
from an unknown telephone number ending in 1330, but she recognized Mr. 
Antonio's voice on the other end. R.293, 295, 305-06. A recording of the call was 
admitted into evidence as State's Ex. 2, and is transcribed, supra, at pages 3-4. 
6. After the first call ended, Ms. Kerbs said she called police dispatch because she 
was concerned Mr. Antonio was violating the protective order. R.300, 303. She 
testified that while she was on the phone with the police, Mr. Antonio called a 
second time, but she did not answer the call. R.300. Ms. Kerbs provided a 
screenshot of that call to the police, which was admitted as State's Ex. 3. That 
exhibit shows a call from a number associated with the name "Nik" as well as a 
picture of Mr. Antonio. State's Ex. 3. 
7. According to Ms. Kerbs, Mr. Antonio called a third time from the " 1330" number 
he first called from. R.301-03, 367-68; State's Ex. 4. She testified that Mr. 
Antonio "just said 'hey' multiple times trying to get [her] attention," and then she 
bung up the phone. R.303. Ms. Kerbs said she took another screenshot of this call, 
which was introduced as State's Ex. 4. R.302. 
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8. Officer Watson testified that Mr. Antonio denied calling or making any contact 
with Ms. Kerbs. R.313. According to Watson, Mr. Antonio indicated he was aware 
that a protective order was in place and understood that he was prohibited from 
contacting Ms. Kerbs. R.313. Mr. Antonio did not tell Watson that he believed the 
protective order was inactive. R.363-64. 
9. On July 8, 2014, Mr. Antonio called the court "to find out the status of the motion 
to set aside he filed" and he was told that the judge had not yet made a decision. 
Defense Ex. 3. 
10. Mr. Antonio agreed that a permanent protective order was in place "[t]hat morning 
of the 18th where [he]' d missed the hearing." R.3 5 9. 
Mr. Antonio maintains that the marshaled evidence is insufficient to support his 
convictions because it is too inconclusive to show that he knowingly or intentionally 
violated the protective order. 
B. Reasonable Minds Must Have Entertained a Reasonable Doubt that Mr. 
Antonio Knowingly or Intentionally Violated the Protective Order. 
Mr. Antonio maintains that his convictions for violation of a protective order were 
not based on substantial reliable evidence because the State fai led to show that he acted 
knowingly or intentionally. Rather, he argues that the evidence demonstrates that he did 
not act knowingly or intentionally as he mistakenly believed that the protective order was 
effectually stayed by his motion to set aside judgment. 
After the June 18, 2014 protective order hearing, which Mr. Antonio did not attend 
due to some confusion, the judge's clerk advised him to fill out a motion to set aside 
default judgment with regards to the protective order. R.332-35, 347. Mr. Antonio then 
filed a motion to set aside judgment shortly after the protective order was entered that 
day. R.336-339; Def. Ex. 4. Based on conversations with comi personnel, Mr. Antonio 
believed that this motion operated to "strike the protective order" and set aside the 
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judgment until he had a new hearing. R.337-38. And while Mr. Antonio acknowledged 
that a permanent protective order existed, see R.359, he believed it was only in place for 
the short period of time prior to the filing of his motion. R.359-60. Hence, when Mr. 
Antonio left the comihouse on June 18, 2014 and subsequently called Ms. Kerbs on July 
8, 2014, he was under the impression that there was no protective order in place. R.340. 
Mr. Antonio's testimony was further supported by an exhibit of the motion itself 
as well as a certified docket from the court that issued the protective order. See Def. Exs. 
3-4. Indeed, the July 8, 2014 docket entry-which indicates that Antonio called the comi 
"to find out the status of the motion to set aside"-supports Mr. Antonio's testimony that 
he sought to verify the status of the protective order and motion to set aside judgment 
after he learned that police records revealed the existence of an active protective order. 
See R.345-46; Def. Ex. 3. 
Evidence that Mr. Antonio was served with the protective order on June 19, 2014 
and evidence of the protective order' s warnings fail to suppo1i the State's claim that 
Antonio acted knowingly or intentionally. Mr. Antonio explained that he received a copy 
of the protective order on June 18th and thought the June 19th service was "[j]ust a 
redundant duplicate service" of the protective order he believed had been rendered 
inoperative by his motion to set aside. R.340-42, 360-61. Accordingly, he did not find the 
June 19th service significant and remained under the impression that the protective order 
was not active. R341, 360-61. Similarly, when Mr. Antonio called the comi on June 24, 
2014 to inquire about a matter related to service of his motion, his understanding was that 
the protective order "had been set aside until the new hearing date." R.362; Def. Ex. 3. 
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Mr. Antonio's confusion about the effect of the motion to set aside judgment was 
believable because he was not represented by an attorney. R.347. 
Furthermore, there is little about the calls themselves that tended to show Mr. 
Antonio knowingly or intentionally violated the protective order. With regard to the first 
call (Count 1), Mr. Antonio explained be returned a missed call, but he did not realize the 
number belonged to Ms. Kerbs because he had deleted her contact information to avoid 
"any butt dial incidents." R.342. His testimony was supp01ted by the recording of the call 
in which he initiates the conversation by asking, " [w]ho's this" and states, "I didn't mean 
to call you." See State's Ex. 2. Not only does the evidence demonstrate that Mr. 
Antonio's call to Kerbs was initially inadve1tent, but it also shows that Antonio thought 
he could lawfully speak with her because he believed the protective order "was not 
active." R.342-43. 
Similarly, the evidence is insufficient to show that Mr. Antonio acted knowingly 
or intentionally with respect to the second and third calls alleged (Counts 2 and 3). Mr. 
Antonio testified to only one telephone call to Kerbs. See R.332-64. And as discussed, he 
was under the impression that the protective order was inactive on the day on which the 
alleged second and third calls were made. R.342-43, 346. Furthern1ore, while Ms. Kerbs 
attributed the second call to the "Nik" number, Ms. Kerbs never answered that call. 
R.300. Thus, there is little to suggest that the call was anything more than an inadvertent 
"butt dial." See R.342. 
Likewise, Mr. Antonio contends that the evidence was insufficient to show that he 
even made the third call, let alone acted knowingly or intentionally in doing so. Ms. 
13 
Kerbs testified to the following order of calls: Mr. Antonio called from the "1330" 
number; Kerbs then called police dispatch, which she attributed to a number ending in 
"7000"2; Kerbs received a missed call from the "Nik" number while she was talking to 
the police; and finally, Antonio called from the "1330" number " [s]hortly after [she] hung 
up with the phone with the police." R.297-303, 366-68; State's Ex. 3-4. However, the 
portion of Ms. Kerbs's call log that purports to show the third call from the "1330" 
number is inconsistent with Kerbs's testimony regarding the call order. See State's Ex. 4 
(call log indicating an incoming call from the "1330" number, an outgoing call to police 
dispatch, and then another incoming call from the " 1330" number); see also R.297-302, 
314, 365, 367 (Kerbs providing inconsistent statements regarding the call order and the 
telephone numbers called from). Mr. Antonio argues that Ms. Kerbs's inconsistent 
testimony regarding the order of the calls would cause reasonable minds to doubt that he 
knowingly or intentionally called Kerbs a third time from the "1330" number. See 
Robbins, 2009 UT 23, ,r,rB-1 8. 
Finally, Officer Watson's testimony regarding Mr. Antonio's acknowledgement of 
the protective order adds little to the State's case. The State did not produce a recording 
of Watson and Antonio's conversation, R.314-16, and Mr. Antonio explained that he 
"didn't have a chance" to tell Watson that he believed the protective order was inactive. 
R.363-64. Moreover, Mr. Antonio clarified that he only acknowledged in the "past tense" 
that a valid protective order had once existed; Mr. Antonio explained that Watson "didn't 
2 Looking at the call log (State's Ex. 3), Ms. Kerbs testified that the telephone 
number directly above the number highlighted in red was "the police"-or, as shown in 
the call log, the number ending in "7000." R.300-01 ; State's Ex. 3. 
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put across the question to [him] like: Do you know there is [an active protective order] 
right now?" R.345. Thus, as Mr. Antonio explained, Officer Watson was mistaken in his 
testimony regarding the extent of Antonio's acknowledgment that a valid protective order 
existed on July 8, 2014. R.358. 
In light of the State' s inconclusive evidence, Mr. Antonio contends that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that he knowingly or intentionally 
violated the protective order. Accordingly, he argues, the State' s evidence is insufficient 
to sustain bis convictions for violation of a protective order on all three counts. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Mr. Antonio respectfully requests that this court 
reverse bis convictions and order an acquittal on all counts. 
SUBMITTED thi~ay of June, 2016. 
~L~~ XANDRAS.MALLUM 
tomeyforDefendant/Appellant 
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Tab A 

The Order of the Cour t is staled below: 
Dated: December 10, 20 15 At th!! d,ii:_cc'tl?i•ti.qf:. 
02 :4 I : IO PM Charle_ef~ ~:ll'f~✓-r \ 
Dislric_t G_Pvg/~~e· J 
L>y \ S(t~: .. ~.~-/~· 
Isl Mindec CJatJ.tJ~~~.·•' 
District Court Clerk 
3RD DIST . COURT - WEST JORDAN 
SALT LAKE COUNTY , STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, MINUTES 
Plaintiff , SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMI TMENT 
vs . Case No : 1414 01850 
NIKOLAOS ANTONIO , Judge : CHARLENE 
Defend ant . Date : December 
PRESENT 
Clerk : mindeec 
Prosecu tor : STANGER , CRJ>.IG N 
Defendant 
Defendant 's Attorney( s) : SEAMAN , CHRISTINE M 
DEFEND~.NT INFORMATION 
Date of birth : May 22 , 1985 
Sheriff Off i ce# : 380226 
Audio 
Tape Number : 3 7 Tape Count: 925 
This case i nvolves domestic violence. 
CHARGES 
1 . VIOLATION OF PROTECTIVE ORDER - Class A Misdemeanor 
- Di sposit ion : 08/26/2015 Guilty 
2 . VIOLATION OF PROTECTI VE ORDER - Class A Misdemeanor 
- Disposi t ion : 08/26/2015 Guilty 
3 . VI OLATION OF PROTECTIVE ORDER - Class A Misdemeanor 
- Dispos i tion : 08/26/2015 Guilty 
SENTENCE JAIL 
MO 
BARLOW 
10, 2015 
Based on the defendant ' s conviction of VIOL.~TION OF PROTECTIVE ORDER a Class A 
Misdemeanor , the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) The tota l time 
suspended for this charge is 305 day(s) . 
Based on the defendant ' s conv iction of VIOLATION OF PROTECTIVE ORDER a Class A 
Misdemeanor , the defendant is s e ntenced to a term of 365 day(s) The total time 
suspended for this charge is 365 day{s) . 
Based on the defendant ' s conviction of VIOLATION OF PROTECTIVE ORDER a Class A 
01 81 
Printed : 12/10/ 1 5 14:41 : 09 Page 1 of 2 
Case No: 141401850 Date: Dec 10, 2015 
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) The t otal time 
suspended for this charge is 365 day(s). 
Commitment is to begin immediately. 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
Upon serving jail time the court orders case closed . 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge 
Charge 
Charge 
ll 1 Fine: $2500 . 00 
Suspended : $2500.00 
Surcharge : $ 
Ii 2 Fine: $2500.00 
Suspended: $2500.00 
Surcharge : $ 
" " 
3 Fine : $2500.00 
Suspended : $2500 . 00 
Surcharge : s 
Total Fine : $7500 . 00 
Total Suspended: $7500 . 00 
Total Surcharge : $0 
Total Principal Due: so 
Plus Interest 
End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page 
Printed : 12/10/1 5 14 : 41:09 
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Tab B 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-5-108 
§ 76-5-108. Protective orders restraining abuse of another--Violation 
(1) Any person who is the respondent or defendant subject to a protective order, child protective 
order, ex parte protective order, or ex parte child protective order issued under Title 78B, Chapter 
7, Pmi 1, Cohabitant Abuse Act; Title 78A, Chapter 6, Juvenile Comi Act; Title 77, Chapter 36, 
Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act; or a foreign protection order enforceable under Title 78B, 
Chapter 7, Part 3, Unifonn Interstate Enforcement of Domestic Violence Protection Orders Act, 
who intentionally or knowingly violates that order after having been properly served, is guilty of a 
class A misdemeanor, except as a greater penalty may be provided in Title 77, Chapter 36, 
Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act. 
(2) Violation of an order as described in Subsection (1) is a domestic violence offense under 
Section 77-36-1 and subject to increased penalties in accordance with Section 77-36-1.1. 
Credits 
Laws 1979, c. 111, § 10; Laws 1984, c. 12, § l; Laws 1991 , c. 75, § 4; Laws 1993, c. 137, § 12; 
Laws 1995, c. 300, § 15, eff. July 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 244, § 9, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1999, 
c. 246, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2003, c. 68, § 7, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2006, c. 157, § 15, eff. 
July 1, 2006; Laws 2008, c. 3, § 233, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2013, c. 196, § 3, eff. May 14, 2013. 

